Although weather shocks are a major source of income fluctuation, most of the world's poor lack insurance coverage against them. Absence of formal insurance contributes to poverty traps, as investment decisions are conflicted with risk management ones: risk-averse farmers tend to underinvest and produce lower yielding yet safer crops. In the past few years, weather index insurance has gained increasing attention as an effective tool to provide smallscale farmers coverage against aggregate shocks. However, there is little empirical evidence about its effectiveness. This paper studies the effect of the recently introduced rainfall-indexed insurance on farmers' productivity, risk management strategies, as well as per capita income and expenditure in Mexico. The identification strategy takes advantage of the variation across counties and across time in which the insurance was rolled-out. The analysis finds that the presence of insurance in treated counties has significant and positive effects on maize productivity. Similarly, there is a positive association between the presence of insurance in the municipality and rural households' per capita expenditure and income, although no significant relation is found between the presence of insurance and the number of hectares destined for maize production. 
Although weather shocks are a major source of income fluctuation, most of the world's poor lack insurance coverage against them. Absence of formal insurance contributes to poverty traps, as investment decisions are conflicted with risk management ones: risk-averse farmers tend to underinvest and produce lower yielding yet safer crops. In the past few years, weather index insurance has gained increasing attention as an effective tool to provide smallscale farmers coverage against aggregate shocks. However, there is little empirical evidence about its effectiveness. This paper studies the effect of the recently introduced rainfall-indexed insurance on farmers' productivity, risk management strategies, as well as per capita income and expenditure in Mexico. The identification strategy takes advantage of the variation across counties and across time in which the insurance was rolled-out. The analysis finds that the presence of insurance in treated counties has significant and positive effects on maize productivity. Similarly, there is a positive association between the presence of insurance in the municipality and rural households' per capita expenditure and income, although no significant relation is found between the presence of insurance and the number of hectares destined for maize production.
Introduction
Weather shocks are a major source of income fluctuation that usually translate into consumption interruptions and destroy assets accumulated through years of limiting consumption (Barnett and Mahul 2007 ). These can be catastrophic, triggering famine, displacing families, and transmitting poverty across generations by introducing malnutrition and school dropout (Alderman and Haque 2008) . This is accentuated in rural settings where survival depends on stochastic factors like weather, crop disease, and personal illness. Yet, the majority of the world's poor have limited access to formal insurance (Barnett, 
Barrett and Skees 2008).
As a result, an ample array of informal mechanisms has developed to prevent or mitigate the effects of weather shocks on consumption. Some of these successfully reduce risk exposure, though frequently do so by imposing trade-offs. For example, farmers may choose low-risk yet low-profit investments as alternatives to riskier yet higher-yielding ones (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993) , keeping producers trapped in extreme poverty (Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2008) . Additionally, risk coping mechanisms such as asset depletion and risk sharing arrangements are mainly effective to mitigate idiosyncratic risks. Since generalized shocks --such as those caused by weather--usually enhance highly correlated individual losses, risk sharing is partially obstructed and durable assets lose their value in case of massive sales (Barnett and Skees 2009 ).
In the last few years, weather index insurance (WII) has raised attention as an effective tool for providing coverage to a large number of farmers. In agriculture, these contracts provide indemnity payments if the realization of a weather event that is highly correlated with losses exceeds a pre-established threshold.
There is neither need for actual loss estimation nor individual visits for verification, as these contracts rely on publicly available information from weather stations. Similarly, they potentially reduce information problems like adverse selection and moral hazard (Giné et al. 2005 ). Moreover, it has been argued that WII could be useful to address some insurance market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty 3 among rural households (i.e. poverty traps (Barnett, Barrett and Skees, 2008) ). For example, WII could lead to increased investments in fertilizers and higher quality seeds or production of cash crops (Giné and Yang, 2009), though it could also lead to specialization or monoculture, depending on the insured crop (Fuchs and Wolff, 2011) . Nonetheless, there is still little empirical evidence of their effects. Despite the recent increase in the number of studies related to WII, the vast majority focuses on small sample sizes and reduced geographic locations. For example, Giné and Yang (2009) implement a randomized field experiment to test whether drought insurance in Malawi induces farmers to take loans for investment in new crop varieties, but their sample consists of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers. Similarly, Giné, Townsend and Vickery (2007) study drought insurance implications on farmers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh using a sample of 752 households. 2 With this paper, we intend to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the effect of a large-scale WII: in 2008, the Mexican WII covered over 1.9 million hectares in 656 counties, corresponding to more than 15% of rain-fed agricultural land. Introduced in 2003, it takes advantage of existing weather stations to measure rainfall on insured regions. If precipitation within a certain period of time is below a pre-established threshold, the insurance disburses the corresponding indemnity payments. It is supplied by Agroasemex --a national insurance company--and co-financed by the Ministry of Agriculture and state governments.
Moreover, it provides coverage for production of four of Mexico's main crops of which maize is by far the most important. In 2008, agricultural production in Mexico added up to 20.5 million hectares, of which 73.6% depended exclusively on rain (Ministry of Agriculture 2009). 3 Maize production covered 7.8 million hectares, of which more than 6.9 million was rain-fed sowed land.
The paper studies the link between the recently introduced WII on farmers' productivity and risk management strategies in Mexico. We use a unique panel data set that we collected and constructed, 2 A recent World Bank document (Arias et al 2014) seeks to evaluate whether the CADENA weather-index-based insurance product (WII) improved poverty of farmers living in insured municipalities between 2000 and 2010 and find that "…does seems to reduce moderate poverty." 3 http://www.siap.sagarpa.gob.mx/ 4 combining municipality level agricultural production (for more than 300 different species in more than 2,300 counties from 2002 to 2008) with WII administrative data, weather data (daily rainfall and minimum and maximum temperatures from 1990 to 2008) and the full set of PROCAMPO beneficiaries from 1994
to 2008 (a federal government program that provides cash transfers to farmers). In our identification strategy, we take advantage of the variation across time and space in which WII was introduced and expanded. WII's treatment effect on yield is identified through the time and space in which it was rolled out. We use municipality fixed effects to control for time invariant characteristics, year fixed effects to control for possible generalized shocks, and control for annual rainfall and temperature deviations. We measure changes in maize yields and hectares sown in counties that received insurance treatment earlier with respect to those who were later treated and those who were not treated at all. As a complementary empirical analysis, we measure weather-indexed insurance's effect at the household level using the National Household Expenditure and Income Surveys (ENIGH) for the rounds of 2002 to 2008.
We find that insurance presence at the municipality level positively and significantly affects insured counties' maize yield with respect to uninsured. In particular, we find that WII presence has a positive and significant effect of 6%, which compared to the premium that the government paid per hectare in 2008, translates into a substantial cost-benefit ratio with a magnitude of 340%. Nevertheless, the effect is insignificantly related to the number of hectares devoted to maize production. Thus, although we cannot rule out off-setting effects, there does not seem to be evidence towards diversification or specialization.
Conversely, we find that insurance presence and relative coverage --with respect to total land sowed--are positively and significantly associated with a higher average per capita household real expenditure and income. In particular, insurance presence at the municipality level is associated with a significantly higher real per capita household expenditure (and income) of 6 to 7 percent with respect to counties without coverage.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section I describes weather-indexed insurance and the Mexican case in more detail. Section II presents the data and empirical strategy and models we estimate.
Section III discusses the results. Section IV presents robustness checks and finally, section V concludes.
I. Weather-Indexed Insurance
Weather-indexed insurance contracts (WII) in agriculture provide indemnity payments if the realization of an easily verifiable weather event that is highly correlated with agricultural losses exceeds a pre-established threshold. However, indemnity payments do not directly depend on agricultural producers' actual losses.
These have several advantages relative to traditional crop insurance. First, it is simple in terms of implementation, sales and marketing (Barnett and Mahul 2007) . Second, it represents low administrative and implementation costs since there is no need to estimate actual losses experienced by the policyholder; measuring the value of the underlying weather index is sufficient. Also, insurers no longer have to visit individual plots to verify losses as they rely on publicly available information from weather stations. Third, it reduces potential information problems (i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard) since it is unlikely that policyholders have better information about the underlying index, and policyholders cannot influence its realization (Giné et al. 2005 ).
Nevertheless, WII faces some downturns. First, it is expensive to get started. A substantial amount of reliable information is required such as weather and agricultural production information, as well as detailed studies of the relation between soil type, inputs, and production. 4 Consequently, since weather data have public goods characteristics (Barnett and Mahul 2007) , they are unlikely to be collected, cleaned, archived and made publicly available by the private sector. Government meteorological bureaus provide these services. In addition, since WII design is easy to copy as it uses publicly available information, few insurance companies will have an incentive to incur development costs. Therefore, governments or non-6 governmental organizations need to provide incentives to develop products of this nature. However, one of WII's main critiques is that despite its coverage, policyholders are still subject to substantial "basis risk"
or the imperfect correlation between the index and the actual experienced losses (Barnett and Mahul 2009 ).
In other words, if the weather index and the agricultural losses are not perfectly correlated, there could be cases in which policyholders receive indemnity payments without having suffered any loss, and there could also be cases in which policyholders suffer losses and still do not receive indemnity payments. Similarly, WII could also have unintended consequences, such as potentially providing disincentives to invest in alternative agricultural technology such as irrigation or research and development of drought resisting seeds or depending on the insured crop it could lead to specialization or monoculture bringing all the economic and environmental consequences associated with it (Fuchs and Wolff 2011).
In Mexico, small-scale farmers lack access to private production insurance because land fragmentation, large administrative costs and systemic risk discourage private insurers. Consequently, the Mexican Federal Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, introduced WII in 2003. The program's main objective is to support small-scale agricultural producers (i.e. owning no more than 20 hectares) that "suffer atypical climatic contingencies --in particular droughts--get reincorporated into their productive activities". Individual producers pay nothing to get coverage since it is jointly contracted by federal and state governments who provide resources from their annual budgets to purchase insurance premiums.
Individual farmers get automatically enrolled in the program if they live within the insured regions.
WII's coverage is exclusively provided by Agroasemex, a decentralized governmental agency that was formed in 2001. The design of WII acknowledges the relation between agricultural production, soil quality, crop and cumulative rain during the plant's growth cycle periods. Agroasemex tailors insurance policies for specific crops and regions to maximize the correlation between drought-induced harvest failure and 7 indemnity payments. This is intended to effectively hedge weather risk associated with rain (Giné et al. 2005 (CADER) or in the "Ventanillas Autorizadas" depending on plots' location and municipality). Thus, the results and recommendations should be taken with caution. Despite of the latter, the document describes that a subset of randomly selected farmers were surveyed and asked about their knowledge and willingness to pay for the WII. Among those who were interviewed, almost all were aware of the WII's existence, and over 80% of them said that they would be willing to pay in order to get it if the government did not provide it. This could be used as anecdotal evidence that farmers not only have knowledge of the existence of the insurance, but that they also believe it is a service worth paying for. 8 
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II. Empirical Analysis
Data. We collected, combined and used six sources of data. even when these payments corresponded to 15.6% of the value of insured production, they were larger than the premiums paid for that year. that received PROCAMPO support, we are able to see that the extension destined for rain-fed maize production is close to 50%. In addition, table 1.c shows more information on rain-fed maize producers that received benefits from PROCAMPO between 2002 and 2008. In particular, the first column shows the total number of beneficiaries (and column 4 the total number of hectares supported), the second shows the number of "large" rain-fed maize producing beneficiaries (i.e. that own more than 20 hectares), and the third, the number of rain-fed maize producers that sow and harvest in private land. It is worth noting that although large maize producing beneficiaries are a little over 1% of the total number of beneficiaries, they produce in more than 11% of the land (measured in hectares).
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The fourth source of data comes from the National Water Commission. The data consist of daily rainfall measures in millimeters for every weather station in the country from January 1990 until December 2008. Expenditure and Income Survey (ENIGH). 12 ENIGH is a repeated cross section that contains a rich set of data ranging from socioeconomic characteristics, family structure, monthly reported income and expenditure, among others. Table 1 .e provides descriptive statistics of rural households in counties that will later be treated and those that we use as controls (not treated) in 2002 (a year before WII was introduced). As we can see, in 2002 there does not seem to be significant difference between households located in counties that will later be covered with respect to those that later will serve as controls.
counties' yields with respect to their counterfactual. In other words, we would compare agricultural productivity of the same municipality had it not been covered by the insurance. Since the counterfactual is never observed, we take advantage of WII's staggered entry to compare treated counties with respect to counties to be covered in future years --and those not covered at all--as comparison. Consequently, the identifying assumption is that, conditional on municipality characteristics and other shocks, changes in productivity would have been the same in treatment and control counties had WII not been implemented.
The results may be biased if insured counties are different from those that do not get insured. For example, if land quality differed among insured and not insured counties. Further, it could be argued that weather stations were not randomly allocated in terms of land quality. If weather stations are located in more productive land, the difference in yields could be attributed to land quality instead of insurance's effect.
Fortunately, most of the weather stations used by the program were built long before WII was introduced. 13 Moreover, Mexico's weather stations are located in places of strategic importance for the National Water Commission (i.e. close to dams and rivers), not based on agricultural productivity ends. 14 In addition, we include municipality fixed effects to control for time invariant characteristics, such as land quality. Also, we control for annual rainfall deviation with respect to municipality rainfall average from 1990 to 2008, monthly average maximum temperature deviation from monthly 1990-2008 average, and include year fixed effects in order to control for common shocks.
Yield Models. In this section we present the empirical models we estimate. In particular, we start by testing the hypothesis that the introduction of WII had a positive effect on maize yields. Since we do not observe yield data at the farm or individual producer level, we base our productivity analysis at the minimum aggregation level we can observe: municipality level productivity.
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In the following, we measure WII's presence with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one hectare is insured in a given municipality, and zero otherwise. Also, we repeat the analysis using land covered by WII as a proportion of total land used for maize production in the municipality.
The left hand side variable included in the model is (1) where represents total maize production (in tons) in municipality c and year t, and is the extension of maize harvested land (in hectares) in municipality c in year t.
The equation we estimate is the following:
where is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if WII has presence on municipality c in year t. Moreover, we also estimate the equations using the proportion of land within each municipality dedicated to maize production (hectares of maize sowed land) covered by WII in each year. That is, .
Similarly, the and variables measure average annual municipality rainfall and maximum temperature deviation using the available historic rainfall and temperature data (from 1990 to 2008) from annual rainfall and average maximum temperature for the same municipality over the growing cycle (for the months of May to November). Thus, rainfall deviation is measured as follows: 14 Also, in addition to including municipality and year fixed effects, we control for municipality level characteristics that change over time, , like the number of PROCAMPO beneficiaries, number of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce on private land, number of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that are small (i.e. less than 20 hectares), and PROCAMPO per beneficiary subsidy in each municipality. Finally, we include the error term , and to correct for serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the state level and we use robust standard errors.
Finally, we follow a similar exercise but using as left hand side variable the number of maize hectares sowed in order to test whether WII presence and coverage lead towards diversification (destination of less hectares for maize production) or specialization (the opposite).
Household level analysis using ENIGH data. In this section we describe the empirical model used to estimate the relationship between WII's presence in the municipality and household level variables such as per capita real income and expenditure. To achieve the latter, we combined WII's administrative data, PROCAMPO beneficiary data aggregated at the municipality level and municipality level weather information. Although ENIGH is a household survey conformed by a series of repeated cross sections, we take advantage of detailed household level information to identify correlations between WII presence at the municipality level and rural households characteristics. The identifying assumption is that conditional on rainfall deviation and maize yields at the municipality level, government transfers --such as PROCAMPO and Oportunidades programs--and household level characteristics, the difference in the variables of interests (i.e. poor rural household real per capita income and expenditure) should be negligible had WII not been introduced in the municipality. In addition to controlling for rainfall, PROCAMPO and household characteristics, in our most complete estimation we include year and municipality fixed effects.
The main equation we estimate is the following:
where ln is the log of either real per capita household income or expenditure for household i in municipality c in year t. and ∑ are municipality and year fixed effects, respectively.
is rain deviation (as defined above) in municipality c at year t. is either a dummy variable that takes the value of one if WII is present in municipality c at year t, zero otherwise, or it is the proportion of land destined for agricultural production covered by WII in municipality c in year t. We also include the natural logarithm of municipality level maize yield, ln , as defined in equation (2).
Similarly, are municipality level characteristics, such as those obtained from the PROCAMPO beneficiaries' data set. Finally, are household level characteristics such as household head's years of formal education, and whether the household receives Oportunidades and PROCAMPO benefits. Table 2 .a shows estimates of the relation between the log of maize yield on WII insurance presence (in the odd numbered columns) and WII coverage (in the even numbered columns), as well as municipality level PROCAMPO variables, rain deviation, maximum temperature deviation, municipality and year fixed effects from equation (2) . The first two columns present estimates of the simplest specifications, and then we add more controls as we move towards the end of the table from left to right (columns (7) and (8)).
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III. Results
Thus, the first two columns show the effect of WII (presence in column (1) and coverage in column (2)) on the log of maize yield using only municipality fixed effects. The coefficient is significant (at the 10% level) and substantial in magnitude (5.9% and 6.6% for presence and coverage variables, respectively).
Columns (3) and (4), in addition to municipality fixed effects, include rain deviation and maximum temperature as controls. The coefficients on WII presence and coverage are still significant, with similar orders of magnitude. Moreover, the coefficient on rain deviation is positive and significant, implying that good rainfall (above average) will be positively associated with higher yield, and bad rainfall will be associated with lower yields. Similarly, the coefficient on maximum temperature deviation is also significant, negative and important in magnitude. This would imply that maximum temperatures above average will have a negative effect on yields. This finding is in line with Schlenker and Roberts' (2006), not only in the fact that higher temperatures are negatively related to maize yields, but also on the relative importance of temperature on yields.
Columns (5) and (6) include year dummies, excluding 2008. Finally, columns (7) and (8) present the most complete estimation, including municipality fixed effects, year dummies, rainfall and maximum temperature deviation and PROCAMPO variables at the municipality level. According to these estimates, WI's presence has a positive and statistically significant relation with maize yield productivity once we control for municipality fixed effects, year dummies, precipitation, temperature and the set of controls.
Similarly, the coverage variable is also significant (though at the 10% level) and of similar magnitude as before. It is worth noting that having a large number of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce in private land is strongly and significantly associated with higher maize yields. This could be related to the literature of property rights and agricultural productivity. as we include the full set of covariates). However, it is worth noting that as the proportion of PROCAMPO small maize producing beneficiaries increase, the log of maize cultivated hectares decrease. Similarly, the coefficient on land destined for maize production covered by PROCAMPO is negative significantly different from zero. and robust to the inclusion of the full set of municipality and household level covariates. Moreover, the coefficients of the insurance presence on household expenditure and income are similar in magnitude. In these estimations, we are only considering the rural (villages of less than 10,000 people) subset of the survey. Insurance presence at the municipality is associated with a 7.83% higher real per capita household expenditure and 7.46% higher real per capita household income. Similarly, insurance coverage at the municipality level is associated with an 8.48% higher real per capita household expenditure and a 7.69%
higher real per capita household income.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Pure Premium vs. Actual Premium
Like in any competitive market, the price of agricultural insurance-or premium-depends on the demand and supply of insurance. However, market and regulatory imperfections affect the cost and the price of 18 agricultural insurance. 16 Moreover, the price of the insurance is driven by three components: expected loss, expense load and catastrophe load (Mahul and Stutely 2010) . The expected loss (also called pure premium)
refers to actuarially calculated frequency and severity of the loss. The expense load is the part of the actual premium intended to compensate for administrative and operating costs. Finally, the catastrophe load, which is defined as "the amount charged to compensate the insurer for bearing risk since in any given year the actual loss can be much larger than the average loss" ( where is cumulative rainfall in weather station i and year t, and is trigger threshold set for weather station i and year t, below which indemnity payment is triggered. 17 After obtaining the values of the "drought" variable, we calculated the pure premium PP:
Mahul and Stutely (2010) list a series of market imperfections that justify public intervention in the provision of agricultural insurance, among which we recall systemic risk, information asymmetries, post-disaster assistance programs, limited access to international reinsurance markets, lack of infrastructure, low risk awareness. 17 Given that the trigger thresholds and the time periods did not change between 2003 and 2008, we used the same thresholds and periods for the prior years (from 1990 to 2002) in order to calculate the variable .
In 2 billion) . Thus, we could argue that the actual premium (AP) paid by the government for insuring maize production through Agroasemex's WII was about 16.07%.
Therefore, we can argue that by charging a little over 16% for premium, Agroasemex covers the expected loss (about 4%) and has enough to cover the expense and catastrophe loads (roughly 12%). As mentioned above, WII is relatively expensive to get started, but once running the cost of operation are low compared to other types of agricultural insurances as their operation is based on publicly available weather information and insures zones of similar agro-climatic conditions instead of individual farmers. Thus, we think that the expense load should not take a large chunk of the remaining 12%. On the other hand, we also believe that catastrophe load should not absorb such a large proportion of the actual premium since Agroasemex reinsures risk in international markets in which individual countries' risk (even those of the size of Mexico) are handled as idiosyncratic.
Context and magnitude of the effects
In the Results section we found that WII presence at the municipality level leads to a 6% increase in maize yield. In this subsection we analyze the magnitude of such effect in terms of the relative amount of resources invested in the program (i.e. actual premiums paid) by the government and benefits or second order effects (productivity and income/expenditure).
According to Table 1 .c, approximately 99% of PROCAMPO's rain-fed maize producers have less than 20 hectares, and their share of total land destined for maize production is equivalent to 88% of the total. Thus, since the average effect found was a 6% increase in maize yields, it could be argued that the average treatment effect on the treated ranges between 6% and 7.4%.
Similarly, considering that --on average--PROCAMPO maize producer beneficiaries produce on 3 hectares, and that under rain-fed agriculture maize production yields are around 3 tons per hectare, then the 6% increase in yields found due to WII's presence translates into an increase in production of half a ton per farmer per year. In addition, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, the average price per ton of maize in Mexico in 2008 was about US$230 (2,400 MXP), and given that under rain-fed agriculture the average annual production is 3 tons per hectare, we could argue that a 6% increase leads to an average increase of US$41.4 per hectare. This may not sound appear to be a substantial increase in production, but if we compare this number to the premium amount that the government paid per hectare in 2008--US$11.9 per hectare (125 MXP)--the relative cost-benefit ratio is closer to 350%. 18 Regarding rural household level effects, we found that WII presence is associated with a 7.5% increase in adult equivalent per capita expenditure. According to ENIGH, average per capita monthly expenditure in 2002 was about US$107.6 (MXP 1,130), which implies an annual per capita expenditure of US$1,291.5.
Consequently, a 7.5% increase in annual per capita expenditure adds to US$96.86, which compared to the US$11.9 paid for as premium, implies that WII is associated to an even larger effect on per capita expenditure than on maize yields. This may be explained through possible WII multiplying effects: for example, Barnett, Barrett and Skees (2008) underline the link between WII and credit markets, and
Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2008) propose that WII alleviates what they call "risk constraints", thus unleashing the possibility of further credit uptake. Though we present weak evidence of the link between 18 Nevertheless, maize yield under irrigated farm land is closer to 10 tons per hectare. Thus, even acknowledging that irrigated and non-irrigated agricultural land are not directly comparable, the striking difference in yields may induce reconsidering the overall evaluation of irrigation projects. Moreover, agricultural insurance programs such as WII may disincentive investments on irrigation projects (Fuchs and Wolff, forthcoming). It is important to consider second order effects when evaluating the effectiveness of any program to avoid getting biased results.
understand the mechanisms under which this relation is channeled.
IV. Robustness
Test of WII's rollout exogeneity. Let be an outcome of interest, such as maize yield, for municipality c in year t. To test that WII's rollout was not correlated with pre-intervention characteristics, we first calculated municipality level changes in outcomes from previous year, ∆ , for all counties (that would eventually get the insurance by 2008, i.e. we exclude from the sample counties that are never treated by WII). In other words, we calculated maize yield growth for each year relative to the last one. Then, we use municipality/year changes in outcomes for all years prior to PACC's entry, ∆ , and regress on a set of year dummies and a variable which gives the numerical year in which the insurance was introduced in municipality c:
This tests whether outcomes were changing at different rates in counties that received insurance earlier relative to those that received it later, which is the identifying assumption of an impact regression using municipality fixed effect. The results of this regression for both maize and beans yields can be seen in panel   A of table 4 .
Then, we analyze municipality productivity more closely over periods of time before and after being insured. This can be seen in Figure 2 .a. for maize productivity and 2.b. for the case of beans. In these figures we show municipality level performance before and after WII's entry.
There is no particular pattern in the years prior to entry, which would concern with a potential endogenous sequence in the rollout, either in response to lower productivity problems (i.e. Ashenfelter dip), or following an ongoing improvement in performance. The 'Ashenfelter dip' has been discussed in previous non-experimental evaluations of public programs. For example, Rouse (1998) describes this problem in 22 the context of a public sector training program evaluation in which individuals who participate in training programs are observed to have unusually low earnings in the period in which they are selected for the program. If potential beneficiary households that actually applied for the program were having an unusually low income in the time that they were selected, then the fixed effects estimates might be biased. In our particular case, the 'Ashenfelter dip' would bias our results if WII was introduced into counties that were particularly affected by droughts in previous years.
These results can be confirmed by regressing the average municipality outcome on a set of year dummies , municipality fixed effects , and variables that denote the year before WII's entry
The results of these regressions for maize and beans' yields are presented in panel B of Table 4 . None of the explanatory variables turned out to be statistically significantly different from zero, which provides suggestive evidence that WI's expansion was not correlated with maize and beans' yield in previous years. We use municipality fixed effects models (similar to those used in section 3) with log of maize yield as the variable of interest, but restricting to municipality-subsamples that have similar pre-intervention characteristics (matched counties) based on CONAPO's categories. Results can be seen in table 5.a. The first two columns show the same results as those of columns (7) and (8) However, the effect is positive and significant for the group of poor and medium level counties. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the effect is larger for poor counties than for medium ones.
Fruits and other vegetables' yields. As additional robustness, we repeated the exercise of quantifying WII effect on yields (from section IV), but using as the left hand side variable fruit and other vegetables yields (produced under rain-fed agriculture). The results can be seen in tables 5.b and 5.c for fruits and vegetables, respectively. In line with our hypotheses, we find no significant effect of WII presence (and/or coverage) on fruits and other vegetables' yields.
V. Concluding Remarks
In the last few years, weather index insurance has gained increasing attention as a useful tool to manage and cope with aggregate risk. Much has been said about its advantages over other traditional agricultural insurance contracts regarding low costs and reduction of information problems. Some have argued that it could be used as an effective tool to overcome "poverty traps" by allowing low income farmers to produce
higher profit yet riskier crops or increase investment in fertilizer and higher yielding crops. Conversely, others have argued that WII may induce specialization or monoculture and even divert investment in R&D of drought resistant seeds or other agricultural technology such as irrigation. Nonetheless, there is still little empirical evidence of its effects on risk taking behavior and farmers' decision making.
Using a unique data set that we collected and combined with information on Mexican agricultural production at the municipality level between 2002 and 2008, rainfall information and administrative data, 24 and taking advantage of the Mexican WII introduction and staggered expansion over time, we identified the insurance's effect on yields and household level variables such as per capita income and expenditure.
The paper provides evidence that WII's presence and coverage in treated counties was significant and positively associated with maize productivity. In particular, our results indicate that WII presence (and coverage) at the municipality level increased maize yields by approximately 6%. This may appear to be a small increase, but if we consider that on average the annual per hectare premium paid was a little over US$10, and a 6% increase in yields translates into US$36, then the back of the envelope benefit analysis provides evidence that the budget invested in the program is well spent. Similarly, using household level information from the National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for the rounds of 2002
to 2008, we found that WII presence and coverage at the municipality level is positively and significantly associated with real per capita household expenditure and income. Moreover, the effects found were around the magnitude of 6% to 7%, indicating a per capita annual expenditure increase of US$65 underlying the possibility of a multiplying effect. Finally, we found that rainfall indexed insurance presence and coverage in Mexican counties was not significantly related with the number of hectares destined to sow maize. Thus, although we cannot argue that there has been a clear pattern towards specialization or diversification, we cannot rule out offsetting effects.
Although our results concentrate on a particular case -i.e. the Mexican WII-we hope that this study contributes to understanding the implications of this type of risk management instrument by studying one of the largest weather index insurance programs yet implemented. There are many questions left unanswered, but we hope that this paper leaves the door open for answering them in future research. 1/ Own elaboration using data from Sistema de Informacion Agroalimentaria y Pesquera (SIAP) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The unit of observation is the municipality or 'municipio'. The left hand side variable is "log of maize yield" defined as total production (in tons) over number per municipality harvested hectares. The first right hand side variable for the odd number regressions is PACC Presence at the municipality (a dummy variable), and for the even numbered regressions is the proportion of land devoted for maize production covered by PACC in each municipality. The 'Rain Deviation' variable is rainfall deviation defined as the difference of the log of average rainfall (in millimeters) from 1990 to 2008 minus the log of average rainfall for each year. The third to fifth right hand side variables come from the PROCAMPO beneficiaries data set whereby the first one is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce maize in private land, the second one is the proportion of beneficiaries that have land smaller than 20 hectares and the third one is the proportion of total land dedicated for maize production covered by PROCAMPO program. Moreover, in addition to controlling for municipality fixed effects, we include year fixed effects in the last two specifications. Finally, we cluster at the State level. parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The unit of observation is the municipality or 'municipio'. The left hand side variable is "log of maize cultivated hectares" defined as the log of hectares of maize sowed in each municipality each year. The first right hand side variable for the odd number regressions is PACC Presence at the municipality (a dummy variable), and for the even numbered regressions is the proportion of land devoted for maize production covered by PACC in each municipality. The 'Rain Deviation' variable is rainfall deviation defined as the difference of the log of average rainfall (in millimeters) from 1990 to 2008 minus the log of average rainfall for each year. The third to fifth right hand side variables come from the PROCAMPO beneficiaries data set whereby the first one is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce maize in private land, the second one is the proportion of beneficiaries that have land smaller than 20 hectares and the third one is the proportion of total land dedicated for maize production covered by PROCAMPO program. Moreover, in addition to controlling for municipality fixed effects, we include year fixed effects in the last two specifications. Finally, we cluster at the State level. We use OLS to estimate the relationships. We include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects, as well as a set of controls. The left hand side variable is the log of per adult equivalent real household expenditure. The first right hand side variable for the odd regressions (PACC Presence) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if PACC has presence on the municipality where the household is located, and zero otherwise. The first hand side variable for the even regressions (PACC coverage) is the proportion of land destined for maize production covered by the PACC program. The second variable is the natural logarithm of maize yield in the municipality (same as defined above). The third one is a variable that takes the value between zero and 1 and is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce in private land (as opposed to communal land or 'Ejidos'). The fourth one is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce maize and have less than 20 hectares (proportion of small-scale producers), and the fifth is a variable that describes the proportion of land dedicated for maize production in each municipality covered by PROCAMPO. The sixth variable is yearly rain deviation (in millimeters) from mean rainfall between 1990 and 2008. The seventh and eighth are PROCAMPO and OPORTUNIDADES real per capita transfers received by each beneficiary household and finally, years of formal education is the number of years that the head of household reported having received of formal education. Finally, we cluster at the State-Rural level. We use OLS to estimate the relationships. We include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects, as well as a set of controls. The left hand side variable is the log of per adult equivalent real household income. The first right hand side variable for the odd regressions (PACC Presence) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if PACC has presence on the municipality where the household is located, and zero otherwise. The first hand side variable for the even regressions (PACC coverage) is the proportion of land destined for maize production covered by the PACC program. The second variable is the natural logarithm of maize yield in the municipality (same as defined above). The third one is a variable that takes the value between zero and 1 and is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce in private land (as opposed to communal land or 'Ejidos'). The fourth one is the proportion of PROCAMPO beneficiaries that produce maize and have less than 20 hectares (proportion of small-scale producers), and the fifth is a variable that describes the proportion of land dedicated for maize production in each municipality covered by PROCAMPO. The sixth variable is yearly rain deviation (in millimeters) from mean rainfall between 1990 and 2008. The seventh and eighth are PROCAMPO and OPORTUNIDADES real per capita transfers received by each beneficiary household and finally, years of formal education is the number of years that the head of household reported having received of formal education. Finally, we cluster at the State-Rural level. Marginality Index is presented by the National Population Council (CONAPO in Spanish). It is calculated for each municipality using the 2000 national population census using the method of principal components based on 10 indicators: population, % illiterate older than 15 years, % with no primary school older than 15, no sewage in the house, no electricity in the house, no running water in the house, overcrowding, dirt floor, % rural population in the municipality and % earning less than 2 minimum wages. The result is an index that takes continuous values from 3.4 (municipality with highest marginality) to -2.5 (municipality with lowest marginality). Similarly, CONAPO divides counties in groups depending on their marginality index. For example, the first group is the very poor or counties with "high marginality" (with indices that go from 3.4 to 1), poor counties or "marginal" ones (from 1 to -0.1), medium (from -0.1 to -0.69), low level of marginality (from -0.7 to -1.27) and very low level of marginality (from -1.28 to -2.44). In this table we present fixed effect models that uses the full set of counties (in columns (1) and (2)), and subsets, like only very poor counties (columns (3) and (4)), poor counties (columns (5) and (6)) and medium counties (columns (7) and (8)). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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